

June 16, 2015

Steven Crow Vice President, Business & Financial Affairs **SOUTHWESTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT** 900 Otay Lakes Road Chula Vista, CA 91910

RE: THREAT AND PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT (TAPS) PHASE I

Dear Mr. Crow:

Enclosed is the report for the Threat Assessment and Physical Security (TAPS) Phase I assessment conducted for the Southwestern Community College District between February 17 -19, 2015.

It has been a pleasure to be of service to Southwestern Community College District in the area of Loss Control/Risk Management, and to assist you with improving conditions related to the safety of students, staff, and the general public.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please feel free to contact me at (408) 441-0754, extension 6216 or on my cell at (408) 930-2774.

Sincerely,

Brian Erdelyi

Brian Erdelyi, CPSI Sr. Consultant Loss Control/Risk Management

BE/cl

cc: Priya Jerome, Director of Purchasing & Contracting, SWCCD Miguel Aguilera, Environmental, Health & Safety Coordinator, SWCCD Greg Trapp, Keenan & Associates, San Clemente Toni Brady, Keenan & Associates, San Clemente

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THREAT AND PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT PHASE I

February 2015

PREPARED FOR

SOUTHWESTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

Prepared By



Brian Erdelyi Sr. Consultant Loss Control/Risk Management **KEENAN & ASSOCIATES** 1740 Technology Drive, Suite 300 San Jose, CA 95110

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I. INTRODUCTION

Between February 17 and 19, 2015, Keenan & Associates conducted a Threat and Physical Security (TAPS) Assessment for Southwestern Community College District, hereafter referred to as "SWCCD" located in Chula Vista, California. The purpose of the TAPS Assessment is to identify potential security deficiencies or vulnerabilities to property loss, damage, violence, terrorist attacks or disruption of business.

The TAPS Assessment was conducted by the following consultant:

• Brian Erdelyi, Consultant

II. <u>Acknowledgements</u>

Keenan & Associates would like to thank all of the individual site personnel for their assistance and cooperation during the TAPS Assessment.

III.LIMITATIONS

A sincere effort was made to conduct a thorough assessment of the site(s) listed below. Observations are based upon conditions observed at the time of the TAPS Assessment and were apparent to the consultant(s). The findings and recommendations listed in the TAPS report are based on the profession opinions of the consultant(s) conducting the TAPS Assessment.

Information contained in the TAPS report does not certify that the District is in compliance with any federal, state, or local law(s), rule(s), or regulation(s). The information in the TAPS report does not conclude that all possible existing shortfalls in security measures and practices, conditions, hazards, or hazardous conditions were observed or reported.

The goal of Keenan's TAPS Assessment is to (i) promote safety awareness, (ii) assist in the identification of conditions which may pose a risk of injury and/or property damage, and (iii) provide recommendations and/or suggestions to help mitigate the risks identified. While we are confident that the conclusions and suggestions contained in this report will help you to create a safer environment, we do not suggest that following our recommendations will eliminate all risk of injury or will result in improved loss experience.

IV. CONFIDENTIALITY

This document was prepared for a Local Agency as described in California Government Code 6252(a) and contains sensitive information regarding vulnerability to terrorist attacks or other criminal acts intended to disrupt agency operations. This document is intended for distribution or consideration in a closed session only per California Government Code 6254 (aa). Public release of this document is not authorized without the expressed consent of the Local Agency.

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California Government code 6252 (a) "Local agency" includes a county; city, whether general law or chartered; city and county; school district; municipal corporation; district; political subdivision; or any board, commission or agency thereof; other local public agency; or entities that are legislative bodies of a local agency pursuant to subdivisions (c) and (d) of Section 54952.

California Government Code 6254(aa) A document prepared by or for a state or local agency that assesses its vulnerability to terrorist attack or other criminal acts intended to disrupt the public agency's operations and that is for distribution or consideration in a closed session.

V. SCOPE OF SERVICES

The purpose of the TAPS Assessment is to identify potential security deficiencies or vulnerabilities to property loss, damage, violence, terrorist attacks or disruption of business.

Examples of issues assessed during a typical TAPS inspection include, but are not limited to:

- Alarm systems
- Video surveillance
- Security patrol
- Utilities security
- Landscaping
- Natural visibility
- Area lighting
- Access control
- Perimeter fence and gates
- Signage

VI. SITES INSPECTED

- Southwestern College
- Otay Mesa Higher Education Center
- San Ysidro Higher Education Center
- National City Higher Education Center
- Crown Cove Aquatic Center

- Parking lot security
- Housekeeping
- Lighting
- Visible identification
- Key control
- Doors and windows
- Cash handling procedures
- Public address capability
- Emergency communications

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VII. <u>Summary</u>

The Keenan TAPS program employs a three-phase strategy focused on improving safety for students, staff and visitors, improving physical security and lowering vulnerability to acts of terrorism, disruption of business and other critical incidents.

- 1. Phase I An administrative interview and subsequent walk through of identified SWCCD sites
- 2. Phase II Conduct a comprehensive review of existing policies and practices
- 3. Phase III Implementation of a training program based on the findings from Phase I and II.

This report outlines the findings of the Phase I assessment only. The assessment addresses, but is not limited to, the following elements:

Detection Measures

- Video surveillance
- Alarm systems
- Security patrol

Building Interior

- Lighting
- Key control
- Windows

• Doors

Building Exterior

- Access control
- Utilities access
- Landscaping
- Natural visibility
- Site perimeter
- Signage
- Parking

- Housekeeping **Other**
- Money handling
- Public address
- Communication
- Drills
- Identification
- Security practices

During the assessment, emphasis was placed on the following:

- Reduction of losses due to theft and vandalism
- Improving overall site security for students, staff and visitors
- Decreasing vulnerability to acts of terrorism and disruption of business

SWCCD currently has five campuses located in five cities in San Diego County, California.

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The Southwestern College campus is located in Chula Vista, California. The following crimes were reported for Chula Vista between February 2014 and February 2015.

Fe	b / 201	4 TO Fe	eb / 20	15, AGE	NCY Ch	ula Vis	ta, All G	GeoArea	Types	is All A	reas			
Crime	Feb / 2014	Mar / 2014	Apr / 2014	May / 2014	Jun / 2014	Jul / 2014	Aug / 2014	Sep / 2014	Oct / 2014	Nov / 2014	Dec / 2014	1	Feb / 2015	Total
Murder	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	4
Rape**	5	0	5	1	5	1	2	6	3	2	6	8	3	47
Armed Robbery	9	7	5	8	6	3	6	9	7	5	7	6	3	81
Strong Arm Robbery	11	11	12	9	12	23	10	16	7	2	12	9	16	150
Aggravated Assault**	25	20	17	42	26	41	43	26	38	14	27	26	23	368
Total Violent Crime**	50	38	39	61	49	68	62	57	55	25	52	49	45	650
Residential Burglary	40	40	27	20	36	38	37	30	34	22	43	41	28	436
Non-Residential Burglary	22	16	16	15	16	17	24	11	13	12	19	20	16	217
Total Burglary	62	56	43	35	52	55	61	41	47	34	62	61	44	653
Theft >= \$400	94	100	116	75	94	104	92	87	101	70	129	128	89	1279
Theft < \$400	167	155	166	155	186	174	130	161	158	77	203	177	162	2071
Total Thefts	261	255	282	230	280	278	222	248	259	147	332	305	251	3350
Motor Vehicle Theft	68	67	59	48	83	62	60	70	67	46	83	101	66	880
Total Property Crime	391	378	384	313	415	395	343	359	373	227	477	467	361	4883
Crime Index Total**	441	416	423	374	464	463	405	416	428	252	529	516	406	5533

The Otay Mesa Higher Education Center is located in San Diego, California. The following crimes were reported for San Diego between February 2014 and February 2015.

	Feb /	2014 T	0 Feb /	2015, A	GENCY	San Die	go, All (GeoArea	Types i	s All Are	eas			
Crime	Feb / 2014	Mar / 2014	Apr / 2014	May / 2014	Jun / 2014	Jul / 2014	Aug / 2014	Sep / 2014	Oct / 2014	Nov / 2014	Dec / 2014	j Jan /	Feb / 2015	Intall
Murder	0	3	4	5	6	2	1	1	1	6	2	3	0	34
Rape**	25	36	27	33	35	31	25	41	38	31	22	39	42	425
Armed Robbery	42	41	26	33	28	30	46	36	30	47	53	57	36	505
Strong Arm Robbery	69	65	73	70	67	64	70	89	79	73	66	62	59	906
Aggravated Assault**	263	341	302	290	274	318	311	282	261	286	281	313	304	3826
Total Violent Crime**	399	486	432	431	410	445	453	449	409	443	424	474	441	5696
Residential Burglary	272	292	264	247	266	278	254	284	240	254	290	265	253	3459
Non-Residential Burglary	144	179	152	137	144	158	171	147	136	106	150	153	118	1895
Total Burglary	416	471	416	384	410	436	425	431	376	360	440	418	371	5354
Theft >= \$400	565	585	645	600	677	701	618	558	608	543	685	688	587	8060
Theft < \$400	724	816	774	795	771	702	782	657	719	789	814	897	775	10015
Total Thefts	1289	1401	1419	1395	1448	1403	1400	1215	1327	1332	1499	1585	1362	18075
Motor Vehicle Theft	397	393	422	424	373	426	400	425	428	324	406	376	331	5125
Total Property Crime	2102	2265	2257	2203	2231	2265	2225	2071	2131	2016	2345	2379	2064	28554
Crime Index Total**	2501	2751	2689	2634	2641	2710	2678	2520	2540	2459	2769	2853	2505	34250

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The San Ysidro Higher Education Center is located in San Ysidro, California. The following crimes were reported for San Ysidro/South San Diego between February 2014 and February 2015.

	Feb /	2014 T	0 Feb /	2015, A	GENCY	San Die	go, All (GeoArea	Types i	s All Are	eas			
Crime	Feb / 2014	Mar / 2014	Apr / 2014	May / 2014	Jun / 2014	Jul / 2014	Aug / 2014	Sep / 2014	Oct / 2014	Nov / 2014	Dec / 2014	j Jan /	Feb / 2015	Total
Murder	0	3	4	5	6	2	1	1	1	6	2	3	0	34
Rape**	25	36	27	33	35	31	25	41	38	31	22	39	42	425
Armed Robbery	42	41	26	33	28	30	46	36	30	47	53	57	36	505
Strong Arm Robbery	69	65	73	70	67	64	70	89	79	73	66	62	59	906
Aggravated Assault**	263	341	302	290	274	318	311	282	261	286	281	313	304	3826
Total Violent Crime**	399	486	432	431	410	445	453	449	409	443	424	474	441	5696
Residential Burglary	272	292	264	247	266	278	254	284	240	254	290	265	253	3459
Non-Residential Burglary	144	179	152	137	144	158	171	147	136	106	150	153	118	1895
Total Burglary	416	471	416	384	410	436	425	431	376	360	440	418	371	5354
Theft >= \$400	565	585	645	600	677	701	618	558	608	543	685	688	587	8060
Theft < \$400	724	816	774	795	771	702	782	657	719	789	814	897	775	10015
Total Thefts	1289	1401	1419	1395	1448	1403	1400	1215	1327	1332	1499	1585	1362	18075
Motor Vehicle Theft	397	393	422	424	373	426	400	425	428	324	406	376	331	5125
Total Property Crime	2102	2265	2257	2203	2231	2265	2225	2071	2131	2016	2345	2379	2064	28554
Crime Index Total**	2501	2751	2689	2634	2641	2710	2678	2520	2540	2459	2769	2853	2505	34250

The National City Higher Education Center is located in National City, California. The following crimes were reported for National City between February 2014 and February 2015.

	Feb / 2	014 TO	Feb / 2	015, AG	ENCY N	ational	City, All	GeoAre	a Types	is All Ar	reas			
Crime	Feb / 2014	Mar / 2014	Apr / 2014	May / 2014	Jun / 2014	Jul / 2014	Aug / 2014	Sep / 2014	Oct / 2014	Nov / 2014	Dec / 2014		Feb / 2015	Total
Murder	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Rape**	2	0	2	5	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	0	2	16
Armed Robbery	2	4	0	0	0	1	2	2	4	0	2	4	2	23
Strong Arm Robbery	9	6	8	7	7	5	5	5	5	8	13	12	14	104
Aggravated Assault**	7	16	13	15	15	19	16	10	13	9	18	19	20	190
Total Violent Crime**	20	26	23	27	23	25	24	17	23	17	36	35	38	334
Residential Burglary	9	7	4	13	5	10	8	6	6	8	8	10	9	103
Non-Residential Burglary	7	12	22	11	11	15	6	7	7	13	19	9	10	149
Total Burglary	16	19	26	24	16	25	14	13	13	21	27	19	19	252
Theft >= \$400	26	26	23	29	26	25	21	27	19	17	28	46	28	341
Theft < \$400	57	49	63	45	42	76	59	40	49	36	50	65	72	703
Total Thefts	83	75	86	74	68	101	80	67	68	53	78	111	100	1044
Motor Vehicle Theft	34	36	46	28	43	32	19	38	19	26	42	21	29	413
Total Property Crime	133	130	158	126	127	158	113	118	100	100	147	151	148	1709
Crime Index Total**	153	156	181	153	150	183	137	135	123	117	183	186	186	2043

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The Crown Cove Aquatic Center is located in Coronado, California. The following crimes were reported for Coronado between February 2014 and February 2015.

	Feb /	2014 T) Feb /	2015, A	GENCY	Corona	lo, All G	eoArea	Types is	5 All Are	as			
Crime	Feb / 2014	Mar / 2014	Apr / 2014	May / 2014	1	Jul / 2014	Aug / 2014	Sep / 2014	Oct / 2014	Nov / 2014	1	Jan / 2015	Feb / 2015	Total
Murder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rape**	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4
Armed Robbery	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Strong Arm Robbery	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Aggravated Assault**	-2*	0	0	-1*	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	4
Total Violent Crime**	-2*	1	1	-1*	1	3	0	3	1	0	1	1	1	10
Residential Burglary	7	5	4	5	4	6	6	8	10	-1*	10	2	1	67
Non-Residential Burglary	1	8	3	3	2	8	1	3	4	3	2	2	2	42
Total Burglary	8	13	7	8	6	14	7	11	14	2	12	4	3	109
Theft >= \$400	11	24	23	19	27	18	17	9	8	5	7	6	14	188
Theft < \$400	25	23	18	24	23	21	17	11	21	10	22	12	22	249
Total Thefts	36	47	41	43	50	39	34	20	29	15	29	18	36	437
Motor Vehicle Theft	4	1	5	3	8	3	3	2	3	0	5	2	0	39
Total Property Crime	48	61	53	54	64	56	44	33	46	17	46	24	39	585
Crime Index Total**	46	62	54	53	65	59	44	36	47	17	47	25	40	595

The following is a summary of the top assessment findings impacting global security and safety (not in order of importance):

- 1. Campus Police Department
 - Increase staffing levels to provide adequate sworn and non sworn coverage.
- 2. Money Handling
 - District money to be transported by sworn District police officers.
 - Student employees are never involved in counting or transporting District money.
 - Properly secure all District safes that are used for money storage
 - Video surveillance coverage and alarm coverage of all District money transaction points and counting/vault rooms.
 - Adequate barriers at all District money transaction points to increase safety and reduce the possibility of theft.
 - District money and transactions are only handled by designated District employees at designated money transaction points.
- 3. Lock classroom doors from inside while students and staff are present.
- 4. Equip all sensitive areas and high value areas with duress alarms.

VIII. PHYSICAL SITE INSPECTION

Recommendations resulting from the site inspection are listed under Site Summary or under the individual site name in the tabbed section of this report. High priority finding and recommendations require immediate action. If not addressed, they are likely to result in serious loss, damage, or injury. Medium and Low priority findings and recommendations should be addressed as soon as possible. If not addressed, they are likely to result in minor to moderate loss, damage, or injury.

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POLICE DEPARTMENT

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The SWCCD Police Department is not staffed to capacity at this time. The Police Department currently utilizes private security contractors to provide coverage during select off hours and weekends. The Chief and Sergeant frequently have to respond to off hour alarm activations due to minimum staffing levels. Reduced staffing levels can impact officer safety and the effectiveness of the police force.
- 2. Regular inspection of emergency vehicles is an essential step in safe operation under emergency conditions. The SWCCD does not have a formal preventative maintenance and inspection plan in place for emergency vehicles. There is no process for conducting inspections or maintenance after emergency vehicles have been involved in critical incidents such as vehicle pursuits. It was also noted that at the time of this assessment, one police vehicle was inoperable and a second vehicle was deemed beyond operational service life by the District garage.
- 3. SWCCD police department radios are equipped with emergency buttons; however, the feature is not activated in the main dispatch console. This means the emergency buttons are not functional. A functional emergency button can increase officer safety.



- 4. The front lobby customer service counter in the Police Department is equipped with a standard glass barrier. The glass is not impact resistant or ballistic rated. This decreases officer safety and increases the possibility of unauthorized entry to the secure area of the Police Department.
- 5. It was noted that the key is left in the interior armory door lock. This is because there is only one copy of that key. This increases the possibility of unauthorized entry to the armory.
- 6. Increasingly, suspects are mounting shooting attacks with weapons that exceed the protection afforded by standard threat level soft body armor commonly worn by patrol officers. It was noted that SWCCD Police patrol cars are not equipped with portable ballistic shields. During a dynamic incident such as an active shooter, first responding officers should have immediate access to a ballistic shield.
- 7. It was noted that the door leading from the front lobby to the secure area of the Police Department is kept unlocked during normal business hours. This increases the possibility of unauthorized entry to the secure area of the Police Department.

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- 8. It was noted that the door leading from the front lobby to the secure area of the Police Department is a hollow core design and the hinges are exposed to the lobby side of the door. This increases the possibility of unauthorized entry to the secure area of the Police Department.
- 9. The Police Department is not provided with a secure parking area for marked police vehicles. There is also no dedicated parking for Police Department employees.
- 10. There is no designated parking adjacent to the Pre-Processing room. Police officers must park on the grass and walk in-custody prisoners past other student population to access the Pre-Processing room. This presents an increased danger to the student population and a decreased level of officer safety. It also presents an elevated possibility of an in-custody escape.



- 11. The trees near the front of the Police Department provide easy access to the building rooftop. This increases the possibility of unauthorized building access.
- 12. The Police Department is responsible for responding to District burglary alarm activations; however, the Facilities Department has oversight of the District burglary alarm system. Furthermore, the Civic Center Facilities Department has oversight of District key control.
- 13. The Police Department is located in a converted office building which is not a hardened location. This presents numerous safety and security related issues for Police Department personnel.





Recommendations

- 1. Consideration should be given to hiring additional sworn officers in order to bring the SWCCD Police Department up to minimum staffing levels. Increasing sworn officer staffing levels will:
 - a. Increase safety and effectiveness during critical incidents
 - b. Allow supervisors more time for administrative duties
 - c. Increase overall officer safety and campus safety
- 2. Consideration should be given to developing and implementing a preventative maintenance and inspection plan for emergency vehicles. The plan should include a process for mandatory inspection of emergency vehicles that have been involved in critical incidents such as vehicle pursuits. Regular preventative maintenance of emergency vehicles should be conducted to extending vehicle service life and reduce associated liability. Inspections and preventive maintenance efforts (including repairs and malfunctions) should be documented and a record should be kept during the life of the vehicle. The records should include a vehicle log, a maintenance file, and all work order request forms.
- 3. Consideration should be given to enabling the emergency button function on SWCCD police radios. A licensed contractor can provide information and recommendations on how to best accomplish this system upgrade.
- 4. It is recommended that the standard glass at the customer service counter be replaced with impact resistant ballistic rated glass. This will increase officer safety and reduce the possibility of unauthorized entry to the secure area of the Police Department.



- 5. It is recommended that the key be removed from the interior armory door lock and stored in a safe place whenever the armory is not occupied. This will decrease the possibility of unauthorized entry to the armory. Consideration should be given to creating a second armory key to be used as a backup.
- 6. The SWCCD Police Department should consider equipping each patrol car with a portable ballistic shield similar to the example pictured below. This will provide officers with immediate access to increased ballistic protection when responding to dynamic incidents such as an active shooter. The Police Department should ensure that at least one NIJ Level III shield similar to the MRAPS IV is available to officers. All officers should be adequately trained in the use of ballistic shields.



- 7. It is recommended that the door leading from the front lobby to the secure area of the Police Department is kept locked from the inside during normal business hours. This will increase security and reduce the possibility of unauthorized entry to the secure area of the Police Department.
- 8. It is recommended that the door leading from the front lobby to the secure area of the Police Department be replaced with a solid core security type door. The hinges should not be exposed to the lobby side of the door. This will increase security and reduce the possibility of unauthorized entry to the secure area of the Police Department.
- 9. It is recommended that secure parking be provided for marked police vehicles. Consideration should also be given to providing designating parking for Police Department employees:
 - a. Police vehicles often contain sensitive equipment, documents, weapons, ammunition, etc. Police vehicles should be parked in a secure parking area to reduce the possibility of theft or vandalism of police equipment. A secure parking area also provides police officers additional security when loading/unloading police vehicles, carrying weapons, criminal evidence or other sensitive items.
 - b. Police officers and CSOs frequently carry or wear sensitive items while en route to work or home. These items include but are not limited to:
 - Firearms
 - Ammunition

- Other police equipment
- Uniforms
- Documents
- c. Police officers and CSOs are vulnerable while en route to work and home while they are off duty and typically out of radio contact. Police officers and CSOs should be provided with designated parking spaces near the Police Department. This will reduce the possibility of off duty incidents and increase officer safety.
- 10. The Police Department Pre-Processing room should be provided with a sally port entrance. This will increase officer safety and student population safety while reducing the possibility of an in-custody escape.
- 11. The trees should be trimmed back away from the front of the Police Department building to reduce the possibility of unauthorized rooftop access.
- 12. Consideration should be given to assigning control of the burglary alarm systems and key control to the Police Department.
- 13. The District has a plan in place to build a new hardened location designed to be used as a Police facility. Priority should be placed on this initiative in order to increase safety and security for Police Department personnel.

DURESS ALARMS

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. Administrative offices and high value areas present an elevated potential for workplace violence related incidents. This is especially true in administrative offices, areas where staff have regular contact with the public, and money transaction points.

Duress alarm systems can reduce this potential while increasing safety and security. It was noted that not all SWCCD administrative offices and high value areas are equipped with duress alarm systems.

Recommendations

1. SWCCD should ensure that all high value areas, administrative offices, cash transaction points and areas where staff has contact with the public are equipped with with duress alarms.



VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. It was noted that SWCCD does not have a video surveillance policy in place. A comprehensive policy is a key element in ensuring effectiveness as well as limiting the liability associated with video surveillance systems.
- 2. It was noted that not all high value areas, including vault rooms and counting rooms, are provided with video surveillance coverage.
- 3. Video surveillance signage was not provided at all areas where video surveillance systems are utilized.

Recommendations

- 1. Consideration should be given to developing and implementing a SWCCD video surveillance policy. The policy should cover, but not be limited to, issues such as:
 - Who is authorized to view video feeds
 - How is video used and stored
 - When is video used
 - How are staff and visitors notified
- 2. Consideration should be given to expanding the existing video surveillance system to provide coverage in all high value areas including vault rooms and counting rooms.

It is recommended that a detailed assessment of the existing surveillance system be conducted by a qualified licensed contractor prior to doing any system enhancements. The contractor should provide additional recommendations and specifications for improving the existing surveillance system.

3. Appropriate video surveillance signage should be installed at all ingress/egress points where video surveillance systems are installed.

Example:



CLASSROOM DOORS

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. During the initial moments of a critical incident, before a lockdown can be initiated, closed and locked classroom doors can reduce the potential for injury by denying free access. It was noted that most SWCCD classroom doors are equipped with hardware that can be locked from the inside of the rooms. These types of lock mechanisms are commonly referred to as Columbine locks.

During the assessment, it was noted that classroom doors at SWCCD campuses are being propped open or left unlocked while staff and students are present.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that classroom doors remain closed and locked while students and staff are present in the room. This will reduce the possibility of unauthorized access during a critical incident such as an active shooter on campus.

VISIBLE ID FOR STAFF

PRIORITY: Medium

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. During a critical incident, visible ID can help emergency responders determine who is authorized to be on campus. SWCCD staff members are provided with District ID badges. During the assessment, it was noted that most staff members were not wearing visible ID while on campus.

Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to implementing a practice or policy that requires District staff to wear visible ID while at work on District property.

UTILITY ENCLOSURES

Findings

1. Unsecured utility enclosures and utility vaults were observed at each campus throughout the District. Utility enclosures and vaults typically contain high value materials such as copper, brass, aluminum and electrical components. For this reason, utility enclosures and vaults are frequently targeted for theft. Utility enclosure and vault thefts frequently leave the site without power, water or other critical infrastructure for extended periods of time and they are typically high cost repairs. In some cases, these type of thefts result in substantial secondary losses such as short circuited equipment, flooding, etc.

Recommendations

1. Utility enclosures should be secured with a lock or anti-theft hardware. Utility vaults should be secured with special anti-theft hardware similar to the example pictured below. Consideration should be given to alarming high value enclosures, vaults or rooms.



ROOFTOP NUMBERING

PRIORITY: Low

Findings

1. It was noted that SWCCD building rooftops are not numbered.

Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to painting building numbers on the top of SWCCD buildings. This will help air support to assist law enforcement officers during critical incidents.





SOUTHWESTERN COLLEGE 900 OTAY LAKES ROAD, CHULA VISTA, CA 91910



LOCATION SUMMARY

The Southwestern College campus is located in a mixed commercial and residential area in Chula Vista, California. There were 76 crimes reported within a one mile radius of the campus between 01/01/15 and 04/15/15.



Source: http://www.crimemapping.com

A search of the CA Department of Justice Megan's Law webpage showed that are six registered sex offenders located within a two mile radius of the campus.



SOURCE: HTTP://WWW.MEGANSLAW.CA.GOV

SWCCD JEANNE CLERY ACT STATISTICS 2011-2013

	2011	2012	2013
FORCIBLE SEX OFFENSES	1	0	0
Robbery	0	1	1
BURGLARY	5	11	8
Arson	0	1	0
STOLEN VEHICLES	0	1	0
LIQUOR LAW ARRESTS	7	9	4
DRUG LAW ARRESTS	7	2	4
WEAPONS ARRESTS	1	2	1

SOURCE: <u>HTTP://WWW.SWCCD.EDU/MODULES/SHOWDOCUMENT.ASPX?DOCUMENTID=9866</u>

FINANCIAL SERVICES OFFICE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The Financial Services Office is the collection point for all SWCCD parking permit money. Money is collected with a police escort and transported to Room 1665E where it is counted. Then the money is transported to the Cashier's Office by staff without a police escort where it is stored in a safe until it is transported off-site for deposit.
- 2. The safe in the Financial Services Office is not secured in a manner that will discourage easy movement.

Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended that staff utilize a police escort when transporting parking permit money from the Financial Services Office to the Cashier's Office.
- 2. The safe in the Financial Services Office should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

TIME OUT CAFÉ

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The Time Out Café closes out their registers two times a day and transports that money to the Cashier's Office without a police escort.
- 2. Up to \$6,000 is stored in a locked file cabinet in the Café office overnight. There is no intrusion alarm system or video surveillance coverage of the Café office. The Café is not equipped with a safe that can be used for money storage.



Recommendations

1. It is recommended that staff utilize a police escort when transporting Time Out Café money to the Cashier's Office.



2. The Time Out Café should be provided with a safe that can be used for money storage. The safe should be located out of sight in an area that is equipped with an intrusion alarm system and video surveillance coverage. The safe should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

BOOKSTORE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The bookstore stores up to four days worth of proceeds in a safe in the vault room. Aggregate money can reach anywhere from \$5,000-\$100,000. Money is transported off-site for deposit by a third party courier.
- 2. Money is counted and stored in the vault room. The door to the vault room is equipped with a glass pane that provides a plain view of the room's interior. The vault room is not provided with an intrusion alarm system or video surveillance coverage.
- 3. Neither safe is secured in a manner that discourages easy movement.

Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended that the bookstore schedule additional third party courier transports in order to reduce aggregate money stored on site.
- 2. The glass pane in the vault room door should be provided with window coverings to obstruct plain view of the room's interior. The vault room should be equipped with an intrusion alarm system and video surveillance coverage.



3. Both safes should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safes.



THE TRADE WINDS CAFÉ

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The Trade Winds Café closes out their registers two times a day and transports that money to the Cashier's Office without a police escort.
- 2. The Trade Winds Café is not equipped with a safe that can be used for money storage.

Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended that staff utilize a police escort when transporting Trade Winds Café money to the Cashier's Office.
- 2. The Trade Winds Café should be provided with a safe that can be used for money storage. The safe should be located out of sight in an area that is equipped with an intrusion alarm system and video surveillance coverage. The safe should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

LIBRARY

Findings

- 1. Up to \$5,000 per day in library proceeds is counted and stored in a safe in the money room. Proceeds are transported at least once a day from the money room to the Cashier's Office without a police escort.
- 2. The money room is not provided with an intrusion alarm system or video surveillance coverage.
- 3. The safe in the money room is not secured in a manner that discourages easy movement.

PRIORITY: Medium



Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended that staff utilize a police escort when transporting library money to the Cashier's Office.
- 2. The library money room should be equipped with an intrusion alarm system and video surveillance coverage.
- 3. The safe in the library money room should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

CAFETERIA

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The cafeteria stores up to three days worth of proceeds in a safe in the vault room. Aggregate money can reach anywhere from \$6,300-\$24,000. Money is transported off-site for deposit by a third party courier two times a week.
- 2. The cafeteria vault room is not provided with an intrusion alarm system. It is equipped with a stand-alone video surveillance system that does not sit on the SWCCD internal platform. The existing video surveillance system is not effective.
- 3. The cafeteria safe is not secured in a manner that discourages easy movement.

Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended that the cafeteria schedule additional third party courier transports in order to reduce aggregate money stored on site.
- 2. The cafeteria vault room should be equipped with an intrusion alarm system and video surveillance coverage on the SWCCD internal platform.
- 3. The safe in the cafeteria vault room should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

CDC

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The CDC stores up to \$500 in the office in a light lockbox. CDC staff transports that money to the Cashier's Office without a police escort two times per a week or as needed.
- 2. The CDC is not equipped with a safe that can be used for money storage.

Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended that staff utilize a police escort when transporting CDC money to the Cashier's Office.
- 2. The CDC should be provided with a safe that can be used for money storage. The safe should be located out of sight in an area that is equipped with an intrusion alarm system and video surveillance coverage. The safe should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The Athletic Department stores an unknown amount of money in the main office. The money is transported to the Cashier's Office by the Campus Police. The Athletic Department office is not equipped with a safe that can be used for money storage.

Recommendations

1. The Athletic Department should be provided with a safe that can be used for money storage. The safe should be located out of sight in an area that is equipped with an intrusion alarm system and video surveillance coverage. The safe should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

CASHIER'S OFFICE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The low public cash transaction counter is not equipped with any type of barrier to prevent someone from easily jumping or reaching over it.



2. During the assessment, it was noted that the cash drawers at the low public cash transaction counter were left unlocked while unattended. The unlocked drawers contained cash. I was informed that there have been prior thefts from this area.



- 3. The low public cash transaction counter is not equipped with video surveillance coverage.
- 4. The low public cash transaction counter is not physically separated from the Administration counter by any type of barrier. This increases the possibility of unauthorized access via the low Administration counter.
- 5. Bank bags containing money are being stored on the floor of the office cube located behind the low public cash transaction counter for approximately two hours. The bags were there in preparation for a third party courier pick up.

- 6. The video surveillance system in the money counting room (102E) is a stand-alone system. It does not sit on the SWCCD internal platform.
- 7. The money counting room (102E) is equipped with large windows that provide a plain view of the room's interior.



8. The small safe in the money counting room is used for storage of parking fee money only. The small safe is not secured in a manner that discourages easy movement. The main safe outside the money counting room contains up to \$30,000 between third party courier pickups. The main safe is not secured in a manner that discourages easy movement.



9. The main safe is not provided with video surveillance coverage.



Recommendations

- 1. The low public cash transaction counter should be equipped with a barrier, such as ballistic glass, to prevent someone from easily jumping or reaching over it.
- 2. The cash drawers at the low public cash transaction counter should always be locked when they are unattended. Cash drawers should not contain money unless they are actively in use.
- 3. The low public cash transaction counter should be provided with video surveillance coverage of all cash drawers.
- 4. The low public cash transaction counter should be separated from the Administration counter by a barrier.
- 5. Bank bags containing money should always be stored in the safe until the third party courier arrives to pick them up.
- 6. The video surveillance system in the money counting room (102E) should be part of the District's integrated video surveillance system and should sit on the SWCCD internal platform.
- 7. The large windows in the money counting room (102E) should be equipped with window coverings that block plain view of the room's interior from the outside. The window coverings should be closed at all times.
- 8. The small safe in the money counting room and the main safe should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer(s) can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safes.
- 9. The main safe should be provided with video surveillance coverage.

HUMAN RESOURCES OFFICE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The Human Resources Office is not equipped with an adequate physical barrier between the front lobby area and the staff work area. This increases the possibility of potential workplace violence incidents. The staff work area also contains sensitive or confidential information and should not be easily accessible to unauthorized persons.



Recommendations

1. It is recommended that a continuous physical barrier be added to this area. The barrier should separate the front lobby area from the staff work area. The barrier should restrict free movement into the staff work area. Examples of physical barriers are high counter tops and customer service windows.

ATM OUTSIDE BOOKSTORE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The ATM machine located outside the bookstore is not equipped with an internal camera or any external video surveillance coverage. This presents an elevated risk of theft, robbery or violent confrontation, especially during off hours.



Recommendations

1. It is recommended that the ATM machine located outside the bookstore be provided with a camera or external video surveillance coverage to reduce the risk of theft, robbery or violent confrontation.

FACILITIES OFFICE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. SWCCD master keys are stored in the Facilities Office in two wall mounted key lockboxes. The boxes only provide minimal security for the keys. This presents an elevated risk of theft or unauthorized access.



Recommendations

1. It is recommended that all SWCCD master keys be stored in a safe to provide additional security and reduce the risk of theft or unauthorized access. The District should consider transferring control of the master keys to the Campus Police Department and relocating key storage to the Police Department building.

AUTO SHOP/MAINTENANCE BUILDING

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. Rolling recycle bins and trash cans are being stored near the exterior walls of campus buildings. This presents an elevated potential for arson fires, especially when the bins contain combustible material.
- 2. The fuel storage tank is not provided with video surveillance coverage or motion alarm coverage. The fuel storage tank is susceptible to theft or acts of terrorism.



Recommendations

- 1. Rolling recycle bins, trash cans and dumpsters should be secured away from site buildings in a manner that prevents them from being moved. Emptying recycle bins and trash cans daily will help reduce the potential for arson fires.
- 2. Consideration should be given to providing video surveillance coverage and motion alarm coverage of the fuel storage tank. This can reduce the possibility of theft or acts of terrorism. Installation of a card lock type fueling system would increase security and reduce the possibility of fuel theft from this location.

SWITCH GEAR BUILDING ADJACENT TO LOT C

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The chain link fence surrounding the switch gear cabinets provides plain view of the equipment from outside the yard. Switching gear is part of the site infrastructure and is susceptible to theft or acts of terrorism.



Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to providing a visual barrier around the chain link fence and equipment yard. This could reduce the possibility of equipment theft or acts of terrorism.

GAS MAIN ADJACENT TO STAFF PARKING LOT

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The gas main adjacent to the staff parking lot is not provided with any type of barrier to prevent tampering or acts of terrorism.



Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to equipping the gas main with a barrier such as a cage or fence. This could reduce the possibility of gas main tampering or acts of terrorism.

GAS MAIN ADJACENT TO BUILDING 1282

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The gas main adjacent to Building 1282 is not provided with any type of barrier to prevent vehicle strikes, tampering or acts of terrorism.



Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to equipping the gas main with barriers such as traffic bollards and a cage or fence. This could reduce the possibility of a gas main breakage due to a vehicle strike. It could also reduce the possibility of tampering or acts of terrorism.

EXTERIOR LANDSCAPE

Findings

1. It was noted that some of the landscaping at this campus is overgrown. Overgrown landscaping obstructs clear view and provides areas of concealment for persons engaged in criminal activity such as crimes against the person.

PRIORITY: Medium



Recommendations

1. It is recommended that landscaping be trimmed up from ground level a minimum of seven feet or trimmed down to below three feet above the ground to provide clear visibility and reduce areas of concealment.

OTAY MESA HIGHER EDUCATION CENTER | 8100 GIGANTIC ST., SAN DIEGO, CA 92154



LOCATION SUMMARY

The Otay Mesa Higher Education Center is located in a commercial area in San Diego, California. There were six crimes reported within a one mile radius of the campus between 01/01/15 and 04/15/15.



Source: http://www.crimemapping.com

A search of the CA Department of Justice Megan's Law webpage showed that are three registered sex offenders located within a two mile radius of the campus.



SOURCE: <u>HTTP://WWW.MEGANSLAW.CA.GOV</u>

SWCCD JEANNE CLERY ACT STATISTICS 2011-2013

	2011	2012	2013
BURGLARY	0	1	0
STOLEN VEHICLES	1	0	0

SOURCE: http://www.swccd.edu/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=9866

ROOM 4115 - VAULT ROOM

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. Room 4115 is the vault room where money is counted and stored in a safe. Fifty dollars is kept on hand at all times for change and on occasion up to \$4,000 is stored in the safe. The vault room is not provided with an intrusion alarm system.
- 2. Money is transported from the vault room to the Cashier's Office daily by a District mail courier who is a student volunteer.
- 3. The safe in the vault room is not secured in a manner that discourages easy movement.

Recommendations

- 1. The vault room should be provided with an intrusion alarm system. This will reduce the possibility of unauthorized access to the vault room.
- 2. It is recommended that student volunteers are never utilized to transport cash from the vault room to the Cashier's Office. The District should utilize a non-student mail courier or a third party courier.
- 3. The safe in the vault room should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

ROOM 4314A - ACADEMY ARMORY

Findings

1. Room 4314A is the Police Academy Armory. Sensitive equipment including firearms, ammunition and computers are stored in this area. The room is equipped with a drop ceiling and an intrusion alarm system; however, the alarm system does not provide interior motion coverage.

Recommendations

1. The Police Academy Armory intrusion alarm system should be upgraded to include interior motion coverage. This will reduce the possibility of unauthorized access to the Armory.

ROOM 4313 - FATS ROOM

Findings

1. Room 4313 is the firearms simulator training room. This room contains sensitive equipment and is considered a high value room. The FATS Room is not equipped with an intrusion alarm system or video surveillance. This presents an elevated risk of unauthorized entry or theft in this area.

Recommendations

1. The FATS Room should be equipped with an intrusion alarm system. This will reduce the possibility of unauthorized entry to this area. Video surveillance should also be provided for this room.

PRIORITY: Medium

PRIORITY: Medium
ACADEMY STORAGE ROOM

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. It was noted that the hatch leading from the access ladder in the Academy Storage Room to the roof was not equipped with a lock. Roof hatches are vulnerable to forced entry when they are not equipped with a lock or some type of device that prevents the latch from being manipulated



Recommendations

1. The roof hatch in the Academy Storage Room should be equipped with a lock or some type of device that prevents the latch from being manipulated.

ROOM 4304A-4302A - DETAC ROOM

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The DeTac Room contains sensitive equipment including impact weapons and training equipment. It is considered a high value room. The DeTac Room is not equipped with an intrusion alarm system. This presents an elevated risk of unauthorized entry to this area.

Recommendations

1. The DeTac Room should be equipped with an intrusion alarm system. This will reduce the possibility of unauthorized entry to this area

MAINTENANCE WAREHOUSE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The Maintenance Warehouse is being used to store Fire Academy supplies including vehicles and equipment. It is considered a high value room. The warehouse is not equipped with an intrusion alarm system. This presents an elevated risk of unauthorized entry to this area.



Recommendations

1. The warehouse should be equipped with an intrusion alarm system. This will reduce the possibility of unauthorized entry to this area.

REAR PARKING LOT/TRACK AREA

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. Site staff advised me that the lighting around the rear parking lot and track area is inadequate at night. It was noted that there is a limited number of light fixtures installed in this area.
- 2. Site staff advised me that the track area gets used frequently at night and during off hours. The track location is semi-remote and a significant distance from the campus buildings.

Recommendations

- 1. Consideration should be given to installing additional lighting fixtures in this area to improve lighting conditions at night.
- 2. Consideration should be given to installing emergency call stations in this area. This will increase safety for persons using the track area during off hours.

4100 BUILDING - ADMINISTRATION

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. Site staff advised me that the lighting around the walkway on the south side of the Administration Building is inadequate at night. It was noted that there is a limited number of light fixtures installed in this area.



Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to installing additional lighting fixtures around the walkway on the South side of the Administration Building to improve lighting conditions at night.

PERIMETER GATES

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. It was noted that several perimeter gates were standing open during the assessment. The gates are equipped with panic exit hardware but they are not equipped with self-closing hardware. This decreases the effectiveness of the site perimeter and increases the possibility of unauthorized access.



Recommendations

1. It is recommended that site perimeter gates be equipped with self-closing hardware. This will ensure that perimeter gates remain closed when not in use, increasing the effectiveness of the site perimeter and decreasing the possibility of unauthorized access.

SAN YSIDRO HIGHER EDUCATION CENTER | 460 W. SAN YSIDRO BLVD., SAN YSIDRO, CA 92173



LOCATION SUMMARY

The San Ysidro Higher Education Center is located in a mixed commercial and residential area in San Ysidro, California. There were 178 crimes reported within a one mile radius of the campus between 01/01/15 and 04/15/15.



Source: http://www.crimemapping.com

A search of the CA Department of Justice Megan's Law webpage showed that are 17 registered sex offenders located within a two mile radius of the campus.



SWCCD JEANNE CLERY ACT STATISTICS 2011-2013

	2011	2012	2013
BURGLARY	0	0	2
STOLEN VEHICLES	2	1	0
LIQUOR LAW ARRESTS	0	1	0

Source: http://www.swccd.edu/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=9866

ROOM 5100 - VAULT ROOM

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. Room 5100 is the vault room where money is counted and stored in a safe. The site stores up to \$500 at a time. Money is transported from the vault room to the Cashier's Office daily by a District mail courier who is a student volunteer.
- 2. The safe in the vault room is not secured in a manner that discourages easy movement.

Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended that student volunteers are never utilized to transport cash from the vault room to the Cashier's Office. The District should utilize a non-student mail courier or a third party courier.
- 2. The safe in the vault room should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

PUBLIC PARKING LOT

Findings

- 1. Site staff advised me that the lighting at the public parking lot is inadequate at night. It was noted that there is a limited number of light fixtures installed in this area.
- 2. Site staff advised me that the public parking lot gets used frequently at night and during off hours. The public parking lot is located across the street from the campus buildings.

Recommendations

- 1. Consideration should be given to installing additional lighting fixtures in this area to improve lighting conditions at night.
- 2. Consideration should be given to installing emergency call stations in this area. This will increase safety for persons using the parking lot during off hours.

STAFF PARKING LOT

Findings

- 1. Site staff advised me that the lighting at the staff parking lot is inadequate at night. It was noted that there is a limited number of light fixtures installed in this area.
- 2. Site staff advised me that the staff parking lot gets used frequently at night and during off hours. There is evidence of transient activity in the bushes surrounding the parking lot. The staff parking lot is located behind the campus buildings.

Recommendations

- 1. Consideration should be given to installing additional lighting fixtures in this area to improve lighting conditions at night.
- 2. Consideration should be given to installing emergency call stations in this area. This will increase safety for persons using the staff parking lot during off hours.

PRIORITY: Medium

PRIORITY: Medium

NATIONAL CITY HIGHER EDUCATION CENTER | 880 NATIONAL CITY BLVD., NATIONAL CITY, CA 91950



LOCATION SUMMARY

The National City Higher Education Center is located in a mixed commercial and residential area in San Ysidro, California. There were 348 crimes reported within a one mile radius of the campus between 01/01/15 and 04/15/15.



Source: http://www.crimemapping.com

A search of the CA Department of Justice Megan's Law webpage showed that are 23 registered sex offenders located within a two mile radius of the campus.



SWCCD JEANNE CLERY ACT STATISTICS 2011-2013

	2011	2012	2013
BURGLARY	0	0	2

SOURCE: <u>HTTP://www.swccd.edu/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=9866</u>

MONEY ROOM

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The site stores up to \$1000 at a time in a safe located in the Money Room. Money is transported from the Money Room to the Cashier's Office daily by a District mail courier who is a student volunteer.
- 2. The safe in the vault room is not secured in a manner that discourages easy movement.

Recommendations

- 1. It is recommended that student volunteers are never utilized to transport cash from the Money Room to the Cashier's Office. The District should utilize a non-student mail courier or a third party courier.
- 2. The safe in the Money Room should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.

DENTAL LAB

Findings

1. It was noted that the doors leading from the public lobby to the patient area of the Dental Lab are locked from the outside during normal business hours. This is done to control access to the patient area. Patients often exit the patient area to use the restroom then they have to be let back in through the locked doors. This is disruptive for Dental Lab Staff working in the patient area.

Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to installing a camera/intercom system and a remote door release at one of the doors leading from the public lobby to the patient area. This will allow Dental Lab staff to open the door for patients remotely form the rear office in the patient area. Staff advised this would be less disruptive than the current process.

SERVER ROOM

PRIORITY: Medium

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. It was noted that the hatch leading from the access ladder in the Server Room to the roof was not equipped with a lock. Roof hatches are vulnerable to forced entry when they are not equipped with a lock or some type of device that prevents the latch from being manipulated.

Recommendations

1. The roof hatch in the Server Room should be equipped with a lock or some type of device that prevents the latch from being manipulated.

ROOM 7208B

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. This room is equipped with a video surveillance camera. The camera does not provide coverage at the back of the room, behind the instructor's desk, where valuable items are stored. The instructor informed me that there is a need to provide video coverage in this area.

Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to moving the existing camera or adding an additional camera to provide video surveillance coverage of the area behind the instructor's desk.

ROOM 7208A - COMPUTER LAB

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. This room is equipped with a video surveillance camera. Due to the placement of the camera, it does not provide coverage of the "Pay for Print" machine. The instructor informed me that there is a need to provide video coverage of the "Pay for Print" machine.

Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to moving the existing camera or adding an additional camera to provide video surveillance coverage of the "Pay for Print" machine.

PARKING GARAGE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The bridge leading from the Dental Lab to the parking structure is not provided with video surveillance coverage. This area is obstructed from view of the main building and is frequently used to access the parking structure during off hours.
- 2. The bottom level of the parking structure and the parking structure stairwells are not provided with adequate lighting. Both areas are dark even during daytime hours.

Recommendations

- 1. Consideration should be given to providing video surveillance coverage of the bridge leading to the parking lot structure.
- 2. It is recommended that the bottom level of the parking structure and the parking structure stairwells be provided with addition fixtures to improve lighting in this area.

CROWN COVE AQUATIC CENTER | SILVER STRAND BEACH - 5000 HIGHWAY 75, CORONADO, CA 92118



LOCATION SUMMARY

The Crown Cove Aquatic Center is located on Silver Strand Beach in Coronado, California. There were 37 crimes reported within a one mile radius of the site between 01/01/15 and 04/15/15.



Source: http://www.crimemapping.com

A search of the CA Department of Justice Megan's Law webpage showed that are no registered sex offenders located within a two mile radius of the site.



SOURCE: <u>http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov</u>

INSTRUCTIONAL OFFICE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

1. The Instructional Office stores less than \$100 at a time. Instructional Office money is transported to the Cashier's Office daily by a District mail courier who is a student volunteer.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that student volunteers are never utilized to transport cash from the Instructional Office to the Cashier's Office. The District should utilize a non-student mail courier or a third party courier.

CPR OFFICE

PRIORITY: Medium

Findings

- 1. The CPR Office stores up to \$3000 in a light lockbox. The office is not equipped with a safe that can be used for money storage.
- 2. CPR Office money is transported to the Cashier's Office daily by a District mail courier who is a student volunteer.

Recommendations

- 1. The CPR Office should be provided with a safe that can be used for money storage. The safe should be located out of sight in an area that is equipped with an intrusion alarm system and video surveillance coverage. The safe should be bolted directly to the concrete floor to discourage easy movement. The safe manufacturer can provide information on acceptable hardware and procedures for properly mounting the safe.
- 2. It is recommended that student volunteers are never utilized to transport cash from the Instructional Office to the Cashier's Office. The District should utilize a non-student mail courier or a third party courier.